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A Prisoner’s Constitutional Right to Medical Information: 
Doctrinally Flawed and a Threat to State Informed Consent Law 
 
Robert Gatter* 
Abstract:  White v. Napoleon and its progeny recognize a substantive due process right to 
receive the disclosure of medical treatment information.  While each case involves a 
prisoner receiving treatment while in custody, the constitutional right described in those 
cases is not limited to prisoners.  Instead, the right is described as belonging to all 
individuals.  Consequently, this line of cases is poised to interfere with the disclosure 
standards that operate in state informed consent law in the many instances where state 
action exists.  This Article argues that the substantive due process right recognized in 
White should be overturned.  The right is based on an erroneous assumption that the 
Constitution protects an interest in autonomous medical decision-making rather than 
simply an interest in avoiding a battery.  It also will erode valuable heterogeneity in state 
disclosure standards and subject those standards to the politics of substantive due process.  
Third, it is not necessary.  Other means exist to protect the interest of prisoners in 
receiving material treatment information and to address states with uniquely inadequate 
disclosure standards. 
 
 In 1990 the Third Circuit ruled in White v. Napoleon that a prisoner stated a 
section 1983 claim against a prison physician when the prisoner alleged that the 
physician refused to answer the prisoner’s request for information about a prescription 
drug that the prison doctor recommended.1  In so ruling, the Court held that prisoners 
have a substantive due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal 
Constitution to sufficient information to make an intelligent choice about whether to 
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1
 See 897 F.2d 103 (3rd Cir. 1990). 
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 2 
consent to or refuse proposed medical treatments, and that the alleged breach of this right 
was sufficient to sustain the prisoner’s section 1983 claim.2 
Since White, a series of cases has found that the Due Process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects as a fundamental liberty interest the right to receive 
material information about medical treatment as part of the informed consent process.3  
The right to receive medical information was held to derive from a foundational right to 
refuse unwanted medical treatment, which is also protected under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process clause.4  These courts reasoned that a right to refuse treatment 
is meaningless unless it can be exercised intelligently, which requires that information be 
                                                 
2
 See id. 
3
 See Rainwater v. Alarcon, 268 Fed. Appx. 531 (9th Cir. 2008) (summary judgment inappropriate where 
material question of fact remains as to whether plaintiff received sufficient medical information pursuant to 
the Fourteenth Amendment); Pabon v. Wright, 459 F. 3d 241 (2d Cir. 2006) (Fourteenth Amendment right 
to refuse medical treatment carries with it a concomitant right to such information as a reasonable person 
would need to make an informed decision about medical treatment); O’Neil v. U.S., 2008 WL 906470 (S. 
D. W. Va. 2008) (overruling magistrate’s dismissal of prisoner’s claim that prison doctors violated his due 
process rights under the Fifth Amendment by failing to provide the prisoner with medical information 
sufficient to permit an informed decision regarding medical treatment); Benson v. Terhune, 304 F.3d  874 
(9th Cir. 2002) (Due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects substantively the right to bodily 
integrity, the right to refuse medical treatment, and the right to receive information sufficient to exercise 
those rights intelligently); Lara v. Bloomberg, 2008 WL 123840 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (prisoner raised separate 
Fourteenth Amendment claim when he alleged that prison physicians failed to provide him with 
information about the side effects of a medical treatment even though the claim was dismissed for failure to 
allege that the prison physicians acted with deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s rights); Clarkson v. 
Coughlin, 898 F. Supp. 1019 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)(allegation that prison failed to provide a sign language 
interpreter to help provide treatment information to deaf inmates is sufficient to allege a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment due process right to receive treatment information so as to consent to or refuse 
proposed medication); Alston v. Bendheim, ___ F.Supp.2d ___, 2009 WL 400355574 (D. __ Nov. 23, 
2009)(claim that prison doctor violated a prisoner’s substantive due process right to the disclosure of 
material information related to prescribed medication was dismissed but only for failure to sufficiently 
allege the intent element of the claim).   But see Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, 269 F. 
Supp. 2d 1286 (W.D. Wash. 2002) (failure of researchers to disclose alleged financial conflicts of interest 
did not violate the substantive due process rights of research subjects so long as subjects were informed that 
they were participating in a medical experiment). 
4
 See e.g. Pabon, 459 F.3d at 249-250 (“in order to permit prisoners to exercise their right to refuse 
unwanted treatment, there exists a liberty interest in receiving such information as a reasonable patient 
would require in order to make an informed decision as to whether to accept or reject proposed medical 
treatment.”). 
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provided to a patient, and so the right to refuse treatment must give rise to a right to 
receive medical information.5 
Moreover, this line of cases equates the scope of the constitutional right to receive 
medical information with the typical scope of a state-law right to receive all material 
treatment information, including information about one’s diagnosis, prognosis, the nature 
of the proposed treatment, the risks and benefits of the proposed treatments, any 
alternatives to the proposed treatments, and the risks and benefits of any such 
alternatives.6  In other words, White and its progeny transform disclosure duties under 
state liability law into a constitutional duty, at least whenever state action exists. 
This Article argues that White and cases that have relied on its holding were 
wrongly decided both as a matter of constitutional doctrine and as a matter of policy.  
First, they rest on an unreasonable extrapolation from the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health7 concerning the right to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment.  Cruzan should be read in the context of later cases 
confirming the power of states to outlaw physician-assisted suicide and the authority of 
government to inject itself into the informed consent process for abortion procedures.  
Doing so reveals that individuals likely have a substantive due process right to avoid 
unwanted bodily invasions, but not a right to well-informed treatment decisions.  This 
seems all the more likely given the Supreme Court’s instruction that substantive due 
                                                 
5
 See id. 
6
 See e.g., Benson, 304 F.3d  at 884 and 884 n.10 (describing the elements of disclosure and equating them 
with typical state disclosure requirements). 
7
 See 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
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process claims be resolved on the narrowest possible terms and that federal courts guard 
against an expansive reading of the Due Process clause.8 
In short, the right of prisoners to be provided with material information about 
proposed medical care as part of the informed consent process as articulated in White is 
not secure because it is based on a weak doctrinal foundation.  Furthermore, it is not 
necessary to protect the interest of prisoners in sufficient treatment information.  Other 
alternatives exist, including the State’s constitutional obligation to provide for the 
medical needs of those it holds in custody and state and federal tort claims.9 
Even beyond doctrine, however, protecting the medical interests of prisoners by 
recognizing a constitutional right for all to receive treatment information is a bad idea 
because it will confound state informed consent law.  The state action doctrine is not 
sufficient to prevent individuals outside of prison from challenging the validity of state 
informed consent law because state action exists in many such cases.  In those cases, the 
federal constitutional right to the disclosure of material treatment information would 
trump any state-law right.  This would result in each state’s either enforcing two different 
disclosure standards (a federal one for physicians when they are state actors and a state-
law standard for when they are not) or adopting the constitutional standard as the state-
law standard.  Either way the authority of states to regulate the medical profession is 
significantly diminished.  Moreover, when White’s constitutional right to the disclosure 
of material treatment information is used to challenge state informed consent law, it will 
subject state law to the politics of federal substantive due process jurisprudence. 
                                                 
8
 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-721(1997) (warning that substantive due process rights 
should be expanded only reluctantly and then based only on careful description). 
9
   See infra notes 86through 94 and the accompanying text. 
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In short, a right to the disclosure of material treatment information based, as it is 
under White, on a substantive due process right to refuse unwanted medical treatment 
threatens to destabilize state informed consent law.  We are better served by relying on 
other means for enforcing a prisoner’s right to the disclosure of treatment information 
that are unlikely to affect state disclosure standards.  Of course, this would mean that 
individuals could not use White to challenge woefully inadequate disclosure standards 
that exist in several states.  Other strategies exist, however, to assure that patients in those 
states receive an adequate minimum of information as part of the informed consent 
process, including the enforcement of disclosure standards in mandatory institutional 
policies, professional licensure actions, and – where state action exists – equal protection 
claims. 
Part I describes White and its progeny as well as the reasoning that led to finding a 
right to receive treatment information.  Part II critiques that line of cases as resting on an 
overly broad interpretation of Cruzan and concluding that a prisoner’s interest in 
informed medical decision-making would be better protected if the right to the disclosure 
of treatment information were enforced through the Eighth Amendment or state and 
federal tort claims available to prisoners.  Part III argues that a substantive due process 
right to the disclosure of material treatment information as articulated in White threatens 
to invade and alter disclosure standards under state law, which will undermine state 
regulation of medical practice and distort the normative framework of state informed 
consent law by subjecting it to federal substantive due process jurisprudence.  Part III 
also argues that a broadly applicable substantive due process right to the disclosure of 
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2010) 
 6 
material treatment information is not necessary to address even the most inadequate state 
disclosure standards. 
 
I. White v. Napoleon and the Cases that Followed 
Like most of the cases that have addressed whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause creates a right to receive treatment information, the dispute in White 
v. Napoleon arose out of medical care provided to an inmate.  Norwood White was one of 
three prisoners in the New Jersey prison system who jointly filed a civil rights suit 
against a prison physician, Dr. John Napoleon.  White first came under the care of Dr. 
Napoleon when White was transferred from one prison to the prison at which Dr. 
Napoleon worked.  White suffered from persistent ear infections, which had been brought 
under control by a different physician who had treated White prior to White’s transfer.  
White requested that Dr. Napoleon continue that course of treatment, and the doctor 
refused.  Instead, Dr. Napoleon insisted on pursuing treatments that, when attempted by 
White’s prior physician, had proven ineffective and painful.10  This was the common 
starting place for each of White’s many complaints about the quality of care he received 
from Dr. Napoleon, including White’s consent-related complaint.  He alleged that, at one 
point, Dr. Napoleon recommended that White use a substance called “Debrox.”11  White, 
who was allergic to penicillin, asked about the ingredients of Debrox in an effort to 
assure himself that it did not contain penicillin.12  White alleged that Dr. Napoleon would 
not tell White anything about the substance except that it was a cleansing solution.13  As a 
                                                 
10
   See 897 F.2d 103, 106-107. 
11
   See id. 
12
   See id. 
13
   See id. 
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result, White refused the Debrox, and Dr. Napoleon filed disciplinary charges against 
White for failing to cooperate with the prescribed treatment plan.14 
White’s suit claimed that he had a constitutional right to be informed about the 
recommended treatment as well as a right to be free from retaliation by Dr. Napoleon for 
seeking to exercise his right to be informed.15  Further, he claimed that Dr. Napoleon 
filed disciplinary charges with malicious intent to discourage White and other prisoners 
from exercising their right to refuse treatments he recommended.16  Dr. Napoleon moved 
to dismiss White’s claim, and the federal district court granted the motion.17  White 
appealed, and a panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the 
ruling.  The appellate court held that the district court erred in interpreting White’s claim 
as a procedural due process claim only rather than also considering it as a substantive due 
process claim.18  The Court of Appeals then went on to find that White adequately 
alleged a claim based on a substantive due process analysis.19 
Central to the Third Circuit’s analysis was that a right to receive treatment 
information is implicit in the substantive due process right to refuse unwanted medical 
treatment.  The Court wrote that a “right to refuse treatment is useless without knowledge 
of the proposed treatment,” 20 and thus it recognized a right to be informed of treatment 
information.21  Moreover, the Court noted that the right to refuse treatment – from which 
the right to receive treatment information springs – is itself “derive[d] from each person’s 
fundamental right to be free from unjustified intrusions on personal security,” a right that 
                                                 
14
   See id. 
15
   See id. at 111. 
16
   See id. 
17
   See id. at 105. 
18
   See id. at 111. 
19
   See id. at 111-114. 
20
   Id. 113. 
21
   See id. 
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the Court also described as a liberty interest in being free of “unjustified intrusions of the 
body.”22  Thus, while the constitutional right to receive information described in White 
might arise out of a right to refuse treatment, both of these rights are based fundamentally 
on a liberty interest in being personally secure and free of unwanted bodily invasions. 
Having recognized a right to the disclosure of treatment information, the Court in 
White went on to describe the extent of the right.  It held that individuals “have a right to 
such information as is reasonably necessary to make an informed decision to accept or 
reject proposed treatment as well as a reasonable explanation of the viable alternative 
treatments . . . .”23  This standard is likely indistinguishable from the typical disclosure 
standard enforced by state courts in most professional liability claims by patients against 
their doctors for failure to disclose treatment information.24  The typical standard requires 
doctors to disclose all information “material” to the patient’s treatment decision,25 which 
generally includes the patient’s diagnosis and prognosis, the nature of the proposed 
treatment, any viable alternative treatments, and the risks of the proposed and each of the 
alternative treatments.26  Yet, the Third Circuit also recognized that the application of this 
standard had to account for the prison setting in which the physician in this case was 
determining what, if any, information to provide.  So the Court held that a “prison 
doctor’s decision to refuse to answer an inmate’s questions about treatment will be 
presumed valid unless it is such a substantial departure from professional judgment, 
                                                 
22
   Id. at 112. 
23
   Id. at 113. 
24
   See Benson, 304 F.3d 874,884 n.10 (describing the informational requirement established in White as 
“akin to the main components of the general doctrine of informed consent as statutorily mandated for 
medical practitioners in most states: diagnosis of condition, nature and purpose of the treatment, description 
of anticipated benefits and risks and alternative treatments (including no treatment) and their related 
risks.”). 
25
   See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir 1972). 
26
   See supra note 24. 
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practice or standards as to demonstrate that the doctor did not base the decision on such a 
judgment.”27  The Court went on to note that, “in exercising judgment . . . the doctor must 
consider a prisoner’s reasonable need to make an informed decision to accept or reject 
treatment, as well as his need to know any viable alternatives that can be made available 
in prison.”28  Accordingly, White holds that the constitutional right to the disclosure of 
treatment information is a right to the disclosure of the same treatment information that 
most states require physicians provide to patients under common law liability standards, 
but a breach of that right in the prison setting is actionable as a civil rights claim only 
when the physician’s decision to provide or withhold particular treatment information 
was not based on a professional judgment that accounted for the prisoner’s need to make 
an informed treatment decision.  
With one exception discussed below, the case law since White was decided has 
largely followed its lead.  Several opinions employ the constitutional right to treatment 
information with little or no analysis.29  The few that provide some analysis adopt 
White’s reasoning that a constitutional right to refuse treatment necessarily gives rise to a 
right to the disclosure of treatment information that will enable an informed treatment 
decision.30 
There are, however, a few noteworthy developments.  First, it might be assumed 
that White applies only in the context of prisoners because it involves medical care 
provided to a prisoner by a prison physician, and because the law imposes a special 
                                                 
27
   Id. 
28
   Id. 
29
 See Rainwater v. Alarcon, 268 Fed. Appx.; O’Neil v. U.S., 2008 WL 906470; Lara v. Bloomberg, 2008 
WL 123840. 
30
   See Pabon, 459 F.3d 241, 249 (“[a]bsent knowledge of the risks or consequences that a particular 
treatment entails, a reasoned decision about whether to accept or reject that treatment is not possible”); 
Benson, 304 F.3d 874, 884 (acknowledging the right to receive treatment information as a corollary to the 
right to refuse treatment). 
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obligation on state and federal governments to care adequately for those is takes into 
custody.31  But language in White and developments in case law since White clarify that 
the right to treatment information is intended to be a right for all and not just for those in 
confinement. 
Rather than argue that the right to receive treatment information sprung from the 
state’s duty to care for those it confines, the White Court held that the right is “retained” 
by individuals despite imprisonment, even though the right may be circumscribed by the 
state’s legitimate interests in operating a prison.32  The choice of the word “retained” in 
that context signals the Court’s belief that everyone enjoys the right to receive treatment 
information, not just prisoners. 
Furthermore, the right to receive treatment information was derived from a right 
to refuse medical treatment, and, shortly after White was decided, the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health acknowledged that the right 
to refuse treatment could be inferred from the Court’s prior opinions.33  Cruzan 
concerned a patient in a persistent vegetative state whose parents sought to enforce what 
                                                 
31
   See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982) (“As a general matter, the State is under no 
obligation to provide substantive services for those within its border [,] . . . [but w]hen a person is 
institutionalized – and wholly dependent on the State – . . . a duty to provide certain services and care does 
exist . . . .”). 
32
   See id. at 112-113. 
33
   See 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).  The majority opinion in Cruzan did not actually hold that a competent 
person has a substantive due process right to refuse unwanted treatment; rather, the Court’s statements on 
the issue were more limited.  In order to bypass the question of whether such a right is constitutionally 
protected and move instead to an analysis of countervailing State interests, the Court merely “assumed” 
that a right to refuse treatment is a fundamental liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See id.  
Additionally, as noted above, the Court stated only that such a right “may be inferred” from the Court’s 
prior rulings.  The Court’s acknowledgement of this inference, despite being dicta, has sent a strong signal 
that the Court would rule in favor of constitutional protection for such a right if faced squarely with the 
issue; so strong, in fact, that Cruzan is repeatedly cited as proof that a constitutional right to refuse 
treatment already exists.  See e.g., Rainwater, 269 Fed.Appx. 531, 534 n.2.  Indeed, the Supreme Court 
itself has been caught under the weight of its assumption and dicta from Cruzan.  In the process of rejecting 
a claimed substantive due process right to physician-assisted suicide, which was based in part on the 
Cruzan assumption and dicta, the Court did not simply rest on the fact that its statements were not holdings.  
Instead, it went to the trouble of clarifying the would-be right in Cruzan so as to distinguish it from the 
claimed right to physician-assisted suicide.  See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722-725 (1997). 
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they believed to be the patient’s preference to have life-sustaining medical treatment 
discontinued.  Because it did not involve a prisoner or one who was involuntarily 
committed to state custody, Cruzan’s acknowledgement of a right to refuse treatment 
does not rest on a special state duty to provide care.  Thus, Cruzan lends support to the 
claim that the right to refuse treatment and other rights that derive from it belong to all 
individuals.34  Indeed, cases addressing the right to treatment information after White cite 
to Cruzan as providing a foundation from which to derive a constitutional right to 
treatment information.35 
Also noteworthy is that cases after White also have interpreted the right to 
treatment information to include a right to receive the disclosure of treatment information 
by one’s physician whether or not one asked for it, and not merely a right to pursue such 
information oneself.  White involved a patient who asked for treatment information and 
whose physician refused the request.  Thus, the right to treatment information applied in 
White could have been interpreted as only a right to receive answers to questions asked 
about proposed treatments.  The Ninth Circuit seemed to employ this limitation on the 
right to treatment information in its 2002 opinion in Benson v. Terhune.36  Upholding the 
denial of a habeas corpus relief, the Court held that a prisoner waived her right to receive 
information about psychotropic drugs when she did not ask for the information prior to 
                                                 
34
   Further support might be found in Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, 269 F. Supp. 2d 
1286 (W.D. Wash. 2002) where a substantive due process right to the disclosure of information related to 
medical research was raised by individuals who were not being held in government custody.  In that case 
the plaintiffs were individuals who had volunteered to participate in medical research and who claimed that 
they had a substantive due process right to the disclosure of information relating to the researchers’ 
potential financial conflicts of interest.  While the claim was dismissed, it was not dismissed because the 
plaintiffs were not prisoners or otherwise held involuntarily. 
35
   See Pabon 459 F.3d 241, 249; Rainwater, 269 Fed.Appx. 531, 534 n.2. 
36
   304 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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ingesting the drugs,37 concluding that “the jail staff had no affirmative duty to volunteer 
information about the drugs.”38  But the apparent limitation employed in Benson seems to 
have been an aberration because courts – including the Ninth Circuit in an opinion after 
Benson39 – have ruled that the right to treatment information applies to require the 
disclosure of information even when a patient has not asked for it.  For example, in 
Pabon v. Wright40 the Second Circuit held that a prisoner, whose treatments in prison for 
Hepatitis C included a liver biopsy and doses of interferon, had a right under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause to be provided with risk information by his 
physicians prior to consenting to treatment, and it did so without addressing whether or 
not the prisoner asked for such information.41 
While most cases to have addressed a claimed right to treatment information have 
recognized a right to receive all information that is reasonably necessary to enable a 
patient to make an informed decision, there is one exception.  In Wright v. Fred 
Hutchinson Cancer Research Center, a federal district court dismissed a section 1983 
claim alleging that the research center and several of its staff physician-researchers had 
violated the substantive due process rights of several human subjects participating in a 
cancer study when they failed to disclose their financial interests in the outcome of the 
study.42  In so ruling, the Court acknowledged that a human subject has a protected 
                                                 
37
   See id. at 883-885 (employing standard for a knowing waiver of Miranda rights to analyze whether the 
prisoner had waived the right to treatment information acknowledged in White). 
38
   Id. at 885. 
39
   See Rainwater v. Alarcon, 268 Fed. Appx. 531 (9th Cir. 2008). 
40
   459 F.3d 241 (2d Cir. 2006). 
41
   See id. at 249-250.  This holding was part of an analysis of whether the defendants were entitled to 
qualified immunity.  Despite finding that the prisoner had a constitutional right to receive treatment 
information from his physicians, which was violated by his physicians, the Court held that the defendants 
were entitled to qualified immunity because the right to treatment information was not clearly established 
under the law at the time of the alleged breach.  See id. at 254-255. 
42
   269 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1294-1297 (W.D. Wash. 2002). 
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liberty interest in being told that she is participating in an experiment rather than in 
therapeutic treatment,43 but it declined to extend that right any farther.  The plaintiffs’ 
claim failed under this standard because the plaintiffs knew that they were participating 
in an experiment that might or might not provide therapeutic benefit.44  It also explained 
away the holding in White on the grounds that the Court in White had not intended every 
tortuous breach of the duty to obtain informed consent to be a constitutional violation.45  
Accordingly, Wright should be understood to recognize a right to treatment information, 
but one that is substantially more limited than the right applied in White and its progeny.  
Rather than acknowledge a right to receive all information necessary for an individual to 
make an informed decision about whether to refuse or consent to treatment, the Wright 
Court recognized only a right to be informed of whether proposed treatment is being 
provided as part of a medical experiment and, if so, the likelihood that the experimental 
treatment will provide therapeutic benefit. 
In the end, a substantive due process right to treatment information has taken root.  
It has been recognized and applied by the Second, Third and Ninth Circuits and by 
several district courts in those circuits.  It is not a liberty interest unto itself; rather, it is 
derived from the liberty interest to refuse unwanted treatment.  Additionally, it is 
generally interpreted as a right to be provided with treatment information from a health 
care provider even in the absence of a request for such information by the patient.  
Moreover, most courts interpret the right to be fulfilled only when the patient has been 
                                                 
43
   See id. at 1294. 
44
   See id. at 1295. 
45
   See id.  Given that the research center in this case is a private institution, the state action on which the 
claim must be based is unclear, and the Court’s opinion does not address – or even mention – this issue.  
See infra section III.A. for a discussion of the state action doctrine as an incomplete barrier to the use of the 
prisoner’s right to the disclosure of treatment information outside of the prison setting.  
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provided with all information necessary to make an informed treatment decision, which is 
virtually identical to the standard for disclosure employed by most states for the purpose 
of determining liability in informed consent cases. 
 
II. The Right to Refuse Treatment as Right to Avoid a Battery Rather than a 
Right to Autonomous Decision-Making 
 
A fundamental flaw in White and its progeny is their misinterpretation of the 
constitutional right to refuse treatment from which those cases claimed to derive a right to 
treatment information.  As argued herein, a constitutional right to refuse treatment is 
primarily a right to have one’s refusal of treatment respected by others so as to be free of 
an unwanted bodily invasion, which right is significantly narrower than a right to 
autonomous medical decision-making.  Because a right to refuse treatment is concerned 
with the actions of others in the face of an individual’s refusal of invasive treatment, it is 
only incidentally concerned with the decision-making process that resulted in the 
treatment refusal.  This is evident in Supreme Court opinions that clarify the liberty 
interest at issue is the prevention of a battery rather than the protection of a broad notion 
of personal autonomy,46 that allow states to promote or restrict treatment refusals by third 
parties on behalf of incompetent individuals,47 and that uphold state regulations that 
substantially influence the communication of material treatment information from 
physician to patient but do not unduly burden the patient’s right to consent to or refuse 
treatment.48  Such case law – especially when read together with Supreme Court 
instructions to construe the boundaries of substantive liberty interests narrowly – suggests 
                                                 
46
   See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
47
   See Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
48
   See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1990) and Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2010) 
 15 
that a constitutional right to have others respect a treatment refusal requires a refusal 
made without undue influence and with knowledge of only the invasive nature of the 
treatment.  If so, then the right of prisoners to receive disclosure of material treatment 
information, as articulated in White and its progeny, is unstable because it lacks a sound 
constitutional foundation. 
A. Separating Consent to a Bodily Invasion from the Assumption of 
Treatment Risks and the Waiver of Alternative Treatments 
 
 Central to the claim that the constitutional right to refuse treatment necessarily 
gives rise to a right to receive the disclosure of material treatment information is the 
argument that a right to refuse treatment is “meaningless” without all such information.49  
The argument reflects a belief that the right to refuse treatment cannot be separated 
“meaningfully” from the right to do so with the benefit of material treatment information.  
The logic underlying this belief goes something like this: (1) there is a right to refuse 
treatment, which (2) implies a right to make an autonomous treatment decision, which (3) 
cannot be realized unless the decision-maker has all material information to make an 
informed decision, and so (4) the right to refuse treatment implies a right to receive 
information necessary for an informed choice.50  As explained below, however, this logic 
is undercut by the structure of informed consent law. 
 In most states the right to consent to or refuse treatment commonly is closely 
related to the right to material treatment information, and certainly a fully informed 
treatment decision is better than one based on incomplete or no information.  Yet, it is not 
true that the right to consent to or refuse treatment is “meaningless” in the absence of all 
                                                 
49
   See supra note 5; White, 897 F.2d 103, 113. 
50
   For a theoretical accounting of what autonomous decision-making means in the context of informed 
consent, see FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 114. 
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material treatment information.  An individual who voluntarily consents to an invasive 
treatment with an understanding of the invasive nature of the treatment can be said to 
have autonomously authorized the bodily invasion – the “touching” to put it in battery 
terms – that takes place in the course of treatment.  This is true even if she is uninformed 
of the material risks of and alternatives to the treatment.  In such a case, the patient has 
consented to the touching involved in the treatment even though she has not assumed the 
undisclosed risks of the treatment nor waived her right to receive an alternative treatment.  
In other words, the bodily invasion that the treatment imposes, the assumption of each 
material risk of that treatment, and the waiver of each viable alternative to the treatment 
are separate aspects of informed consent that can receive protection under the law 
separately. 
The independence of these aspects of informed consent is clearly reflected in 
nearly all states’ informed consent law.51  Indeed, the doctrine acknowledges two 
separate duties that are imposed on physicians:  a duty to refrain from providing medical 
care to a patient without the patient’s consent, and a duty to disclose material information 
about a proposed treatment to a patient prior to seeking the patient’s consent.52  A battery 
theory is used when a physician is alleged to have violated the first duty of the informed 
consent doctrine:  the duty to refrain from treating without the prior consent of the 
                                                 
51
   See Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of Health Care Cost Containment, 
85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 309 (1999) (most jurisdictions recognize a negligence action for failure to adequately 
disclose treatment information and a battery action for the failure to obtain consent to treatment at all). 
52
  See Robert Gatter, Informed Consent and the Forgotten Duty of Physician Inquiry, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 
557(2000) .  See also Franklin v. U.S., 992 F.2d 1492, 1496 (10th Cir. 1993); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 
554, 557 (Okla. 1979); Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188 (Utah App. 1992); Ketchup v. Howard, 543 
S.E.2d 371, 374 (Ga. App. 2000), overruled on other grounds by Blotner v. Doreika, 678 S.E.2d 80 (Ga. 
2009). 
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patient.53  The complete lack of consent in such a case results in treating the procedure as 
an offensive touching and a compensable harm.54 
Meanwhile, a patient who consented to treatment but claims that she was 
informed insufficiently about a treatment risk because her physician breached the second 
duty – the duty to disclose material treatment information – may only pursue her claim 
under a negligence theory.55  Here the violation is not the “touching” because the patient 
consented to the treatment.  Instead, it is the failure of the physician to warn of a potential 
harm associated with the treatment, which means that responsibility for any harm that 
arises from that particular risk was not assumed by the patient and remains with the 
physician.  Consequently, the only compensable harm in such a case is harm to the 
patient caused by the materialization of the undisclosed – and therefore non-assumed – 
risk. 56  In short, the laws of nearly all states recognize that insufficient understanding of 
the material risks of and alternatives to a treatment does not negate one’s consent to 
treatment. 
Such an overwhelming consensus among states’ laws is evidence of a common 
normative view that consent to a bodily invasion is different from a decision to assume 
the risks of a treatment and to forgo alternative treatments.  Consequently, consent to the 
bodily invasion that results from treatment is independently meaningful under the law 
even if it is given without an understanding of the risks of and alternatives to that 
                                                 
53
   See e.g., McNeil v. Brewer, 710 N.E.2d 1285, 1288 (Ill. App. 1999).  See also supra note 52. 
54
   See e.g., Harvey v. Strickland, 566 S.E.2d 529, 536 n.4 (pain and suffering from a completely 
unauthorized treatment is a cognizable injury). 
55
   See JESSICA BERG ET AL, INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE __ (2d ed. 
2001).  See also supra note 52. 
 
56
   See Cantebury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 777 (DC Cir. 1972)(a compensable injury occurs only when an 
unrevealed risk actually materializes and causes harm); Prissel v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 2003 WL 
2998133, at *10-11 (Wis. App. 2003). 
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treatment.  To be clear, a liability regime that recognizes only a duty to obtain consent to 
a medical touching certainly fails to protect patients adequately.  Nevertheless, the law’s 
recognition that consent to a medical touching as distinct from consent to the risks of and 
alternatives to the touching is rational and meaningful. 
If a right to consent to or refuse the bodily invasion associated with a treatment 
can exist separately from a right to consent to material risks and to the waiver of each 
alternative treatment, then this substantially narrows any derived right to information.  To 
autonomously consent to the physical invasion of treatment, a patient would need to 
understand only that the treatment is invasive and that she has the right to refuse the 
invasion.  This, of course, is substantially less than information about all material risks 
and alternatives. 
B.  The Rights to Treatment and Information under Supreme Court Precedent 
 The failure of White and its progeny to distinguish between an individual’s 
interest in avoiding non-consensual, medical invasions of her body from her interest in 
making well-informed treatment decisions is critical to understanding why the claimed 
right to treatment information lacks doctrinal support.  This is because the U.S. Supreme 
Court has recognized such a distinction in its substantive due process analysis in Cruzan 
and in Washington v. Glucksberg.  As explained below, these cases indicate that the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause protects an individual’s interest in avoiding 
unwanted bodily invasions associated with treatment, but not an individual’s interest 
autonomous medical decision-making. 
 In Cruzan the Court held that a substantive due process right to refuse treatment 
was not violated by a Missouri law prohibiting family members of an incompetent patient 
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from refusing life-sustaining medical treatment on the patient’s behalf absent clear and 
convincing evidence that the patient, if competent, would refuse such treatment.57  
Contrary to popular conception, the Court did not hold that an individual has a right to 
refuse unwanted treatment.  Rather, it assumed, without holding, that such a right is 
protected as a liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment so that the Court could 
reach the issue it preferred to rule on: namely, whether countervailing state interests 
justified a deprivation of the assumed right to refuse treatment.58  Yet, Cruzan provides 
substantial support for a substantive due process right to refuse treatment through its dicta 
that a constitutional right to refuse unwanted treatment can be inferred from the Court’s 
prior rulings.59  Indeed, the Court’s analysis of its prior rulings indicate how difficult it 
would be for the Court, if faced squarely with the issue, to reach any conclusion other 
than that a constitutional right exists to refuse the bodily invasion associated with an 
invasive treatment. 
 At the same time, the Court’s review of prior rulings that gave rise to the Court’s 
dicta reveals that a substantive due process right to refuse treatment is a right to avoid the 
bodily invasion associated with an invasive treatment, which, absent a patient’s consent, 
would constitute a battery.  The holdings to which the Court cites each address the right 
to be free from unnecessary bodily invasion or physical confinement.60  Justice 
O’Connor’s concurrence also makes this clear, acknowledging that “the liberty interest in 
                                                 
57
   See 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
58
   See supra note 33. 
59
   See id. 
60
   See id. at 278-279.  For example, the Court cites to Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-222 
(1990), and quotes the following statement from the case: “’The forcible injection of medication into a 
nonconsenting person’s body represents a substantial interference with that person’s liberty.’”  Id.  It also 
cites to Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979), and quotes the following line: “’[A] child, in common 
with adults, has a substantial liberty interest in not being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment.’”  
Id. 
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refusing unwanted medical treatment flows from decisions involving the State’s 
invasions into the body.”61  Her opinion goes on to explain the many ways that medical 
treatment of an unwilling patient, including the forcible provision of artificial nutrition 
and hydration, involves bodily “restraint and intrusion” that implicates a protected liberty 
interest and justifies a constitutional obligation of the state to respect an individual’s 
decision to refuse treatment.62  Thus, Cruzan establishes that a constitutional right to 
refuse treatment is not a right about autonomous medical decision-making, but rather a 
right to be free of unwanted incursions into one’s body, which is protected by requiring 
the state to honor an individual’s refusal of such physical invasions. 
 Cruzan discusses state informed consent law, but Cruzan did not find that a right 
to informed consent is a corollary to the assumed right to refuse treatment.  Rather, the 
Court recognized that states have widely adopted the informed consent doctrine, which 
protects individuals from bodily invasions absent their consent, and that a “logical 
corollary of the doctrine of informed consent is that the patient generally possess the right 
not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment.”63  Thus, while it recognized that a right to 
refuse treatment could be derived from a right to consent to treatment, the Court said 
nothing about deriving a constitutional right to the information disclosures commonly 
afforded by state informed consent law from a right to refuse treatment. 
 Thus, the Court in Cruzan outlined a right to refuse treatment on rather narrow 
terms as a right to avoid a medical invasion of the body rather than a broader notion of a 
right to autonomous medical decision-making.  It did so not only because the narrower 
understanding of the right was most consistent with the Court’s prior rulings, but also 
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   Id. at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
62
   See id. at 287-290. 
63
   Id. at 270. 
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because it was in keeping with precedent that counseled federal courts to avoid an 
expansive interpretation of substantive due process rights.  Thus, in justifying the Court’s 
decision to assume, rather than hold, that a right to refuse treatment is constitutionally 
protected, Justice Rehnquist wrote: 
This is the first case in which we have been squarely presented with the issue 
whether the United States Constitution grants what is in common parlance 
referred to as a “right to die.”  We follow the judicious counsel . . . that in 
deciding “a question of such magnitude and importance . . . it is the [better] part 
of wisdom not to attempt, by any general statement, to cover every possible phase 
of the subject.”64 
 
 If any confusion remained after Cruzan about whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process clause protects a right to be free of unwanted medical 
intrusions into the body or a broader right to autonomous medical decision-making, it 
was resolved by the Court’s holding in Washington v. Glucksberg several years later.65  
There, the Court upheld a ban on assisted suicide imposed by the State of Washington 
against a claim by several terminally ill patients and their physicians that it violated their 
liberty interests to have the state respect their personal choices to participate in physician-
assisted suicide.  Although the petitioning patients were not receiving unwanted life-
sustaining medical treatment, the patients relied on Cruzan to make their case.  They 
argued that, by acknowledging a right to refuse life-sustaining treatment, Cruzan 
recognized that individuals have a substantive due process right to choose to hasten death 
by any means and to have the state respect such a personal choice.  The Court rejected 
this assessment of Cruzan, clarifying again that a right to refuse treatment is not a right to 
                                                 
64
   Id. at 277-278. 
65
   See 521 U.S. 702 (1997).  See also Giordano v. Connecticut Valley Hospital, 588 F. Supp. 2d 306 (D. 
Conn. 2008) (analyzing the right to refuse treatment from Cruzan in light of the later Glucksberg decision). 
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autonomous decision-making, but rather a right to avoid a medical battery arising out of a 
tradition evident in state medical consent laws.  The Court wrote: 
The right assumed in Cruzan . . . was not simply deduced from abstract concepts 
of personal autonomy.  Given the common-law rule that forced medication was a 
battery, and the long legal tradition protecting the decision to refuse unwanted 
medical treatment, our assumption was entirely consistent with this Nation’s 
history and constitutional traditions.66 
 
The Court similarly rejected the claim that Due Process protects a liberty interest 
in making “intimate and personal choices” without undue state influence, which would 
encompass a right to choose to participate in physician-assisted suicide.  In doing so, the 
Court wrote:  “That many of the rights and liberties protected by the Due Process Clause 
sound in personal autonomy does not warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all 
important, intimate, and personal decisions are so protected . . . .”67  This was a 
justification for why the Constitution has been read to protect the personal choice of a 
woman to have an abortion, but not the personal choice of a terminally ill individual to 
participate in physician-assisted suicide.68  Yet, the case reveals that autonomy for the 
sake of protecting against invasions of one’s body is constitutionally different from other 
applications of autonomy, and this helps to explain further how the Due Process clause 
can require states to respect an individual’s refusal of a bodily intrusion associated with a 
proposed medical treatment without necessarily requiring states to facilitate autonomous 
medical decision-making. 
Glucksberg also reaffirms that substantive due process rights must be interpreted 
very narrowly.  It notes that, for fear of placing important matters “outside the arena of 
public debate and legislative action,” the Court has “’always been reluctant to expand the 
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   Id. at 725. 
67
   Id. at 727. 
68
   See id. at 727-728. 
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concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in 
this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended.’”69  Accordingly, such constitutional 
protection is afforded only to fundamental rights and liberties that are “’deeply rooted in 
this Nation’s history and tradition.’”70  Moreover, such history and tradition are used as 
parameters to craft a “careful description” of any substantive due process rights 
recognized by the Court.71, 72  The Court used these principles to distinguish between the 
assumed right to avoid a medical battery and the claimed right to choose to participate in 
physician-assisted suicide, finding that the former has a long history in state laws 
requiring consent to medical treatment while the latter is contradicted by the historical 
bans states have placed on suicide and assisted suicide.73 
These rules of construction in substantive due process jurisprudence indicate that 
the Court would not hold that a right to the disclosure of all material treatment 
information necessarily arises from a right to refuse treatment.  Instead, the Court would 
more likely construe narrowly the assumed right in Cruzan as a right to have the state 
respect a decision to refuse treatment, rejecting a broader interpretation of that right as a 
right of autonomy in medical decision-making.  Further, the Court would likely find that 
such an interpretation of the right to refuse treatment is supported in the nation’s legal 
history, which reveals that states required consent to treatment well before requiring the 
                                                 
69
   Id. at 720 quoting Collins v. Harker, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992). 
70
   Id. at 721 quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
71
   See id. at 721 
72
   In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which was decided after Glucksberg, the Supreme Court 
appeared to re-establish a more expansive test for identifying substantive liberty interests than the history-
and-traditions test from Glucksberg.  See generally Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due Process After 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1517 (2008).  Since Lawrence, however, the Court revived the 
Glucksberg test in what has been described as “a pro-judicial restraint, anti-substantive due process 
decision.”  Id. at 1520. 
73
   See id. at 710-719, 724-726. 
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disclosure of treatment information in support of any request for consent,74 and that a 
consent to the bodily invasion associated with a treatment is not negated under almost 
any state’s law by a lack of material treatment information.75 
The Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence is also instructive because it 
indicates the degree to which the Court interprets the Due Process clause to protect a 
right to informed medical decision-making.  In Rust v. Sullivan76 and in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,77 the Court addressed the 
constitutionality of governmental manipulation of abortion information disclosed by 
physicians to pregnant women.  Read together, they suggest that substantive due process 
protects individuals from fraud and coercion in medical decision-making, but does not 
obligate States to assure that medical decisions are well informed. 
In Rust the Court reviewed federal regulations that, among other things, 
prohibited physicians, who care for indigent, non-pregnant or recently pregnant women 
through a federally funded, family planning program, from either counseling their 
patients about abortion or referring them for abortion.  One issue was whether those 
regulatory prohibitions on the disclosure of abortion as a treatment option deprived 
women served by the program of a substantive due process right to make informed 
medical decisions free of governmental intrusions.78  If a woman served under the 
program were to ask her physician about abortion or were to seek an abortion referral, the 
regulations permitted her physician to respond that “’the project does not consider 
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   See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 114. 
75
   See supra notes 49 and 56 and the accompanying text. 
76
   500 U.S. 173 (1991). 
77
   505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
78
   See id. at 1776-1778.  Because the challenged was aimed at federal regulations, the substantive due 
process claim in this case was based on the Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment of the federal 
Constitution. 
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abortion an appropriate method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer 
for abortions.’”79  The Court upheld the federal regulations on the grounds that they were 
part of a program subsidizing medical care, which program the government was under no 
constitutional obligation to enact, and which does not deprive women served by the 
program of their freedom to seek care outside of the program.  In so holding, the Court 
reasoned that, while the Constitution prohibits government from depriving individuals of 
protected substantive due process rights, it does not obligate them to subsidize the 
exercise of those rights.  Accordingly, the government was found to have no 
constitutional obligation to assure that women served by the federally funded program 
were provided with all information necessary for informed medical decision-making.80 
Unlike Rust, which addressed the constitutionality of a prohibition on disclosing 
certain material treatment information, Casey concerned the constitutionality of a statute 
requiring the disclosure of information from doctor to patient.  In Casey several abortion 
clinics and one physician challenged the constitutionality of provisions of Pennsylvania’s 
Abortion Control Act,81 one of which concerned the disclosure of medical information 
during the informed consent process.  In the case of a patient considering an abortion, the 
law required that, in addition to disclosing material treatment information related to risks 
and alternatives, a physician must disclose to her patient the probable gestational age of 
the patient’s fetus and the risks associated with carrying her fetus to term.  It also 
required that the physician offer to provide the patient with additional printed materials 
published by the state, inform the patient that medical assistance might be available to 
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  42 U.S.C. sec. 59.8(b)(5). 
80
  Rust is a widely criticized opinion.  See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L. J. 151, 168 
(1996)(documenting the degree of political controversy and academic criticism toward the opinion). 
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   See 505 U.S. 833. 
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2010) 
 26 
pay for prenatal care, childbirth, and neonatal care, and inform the patient that the 
biological father is liable to provide child support.  The petitioners claimed that these 
requirements violated a woman’s substantive due process right to choose to receive an 
abortion.82 
The Court upheld the disclosure provisions, and, in the process, it employed a 
new standard announced in the opinion:  a law violates a woman’s right to choose to have 
an abortion when it imposes an “undue burden” on that right.  The Court clarified that an 
undue burden exists if the law’s “purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the 
path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability.”83  Applying this 
standard, the Court found that the required disclosures did not unduly burden a woman’s 
right to choose to have an abortion because the information was relevant, truthful and not 
misleading.84 
While it is difficult to draw hard conclusions from Rust and Casey about whether 
or not the Supreme Court would find a substantive due process right to the disclosure of 
material treatment information, the cases offer some interesting insights.  First, they 
suggest that the Constitution does not prohibit governments from regulating the 
disclosure of information in the informed consent process whether in the form of 
prohibiting the disclosure of material information or requiring the disclosure of particular 
information.  Second, they indicate that the Constitution probably does not require states 
                                                 
82
   See id. at 881-887.  Petitioners also argued that the disclosure provisions deprived a woman of her right 
to privacy in her relationship with her treating physician.  See id.  The Court rejected this argument, 
reasoning that the doctor-patient relationship in this context does not have a constitutional status 
independent of the woman’s right to choose to have an abortion.  Instead, whatever constitutional 
protection the doctor-patient relationship is entitled to is merely “derivative” of the woman’s right.  
Accordingly, the Court found that that relationship “does not underlie or override the two more general 
rights under which the abortion right is justified:  the right to make family decisions and the right to 
physical autonomy.”  Id. at 884. 
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   Id. at 878. 
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   See id. at 881-887. 
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to assure that patients are provided with treatment information, so long as individuals 
have a means to access that information, even if it is a more burdensome means of access 
as compared to being provided the information.  Finally, they imply that the 
constitutionality of a state’s disclosure law would be determined based on whether it 
places a substantial obstacle in the path of a patient’s exercising her right to consent to or 
refuse offered treatment, and, in the context of disclosure practices, that analysis would 
likely turn on whether those practices would result in treatment decisions based on fraud 
or coercion. 
The foregoing analysis of Cruzan, Glucksberg, Rust, and Casey suggest that 
White’s claimed right to treatment information reasonably necessary to informed 
decision-making suffers from several doctrinal flaws.  First and most fundamentally, it 
fails to recognize that the right to refuse treatment information is more modest than a 
right to autonomous medical decision-making, protecting only against a battery.  Second, 
while a right to avoid an unwanted medical intrusion of the body likely implies a right to 
know the invasive nature of the treatment, it does not necessarily give rise to a right to 
know all material information about the treatment.  Information about a patient’s medical 
condition, her prognosis with and without treatment, the risks of a proposed treatment, 
and the risks of alternatives to the proposed treatment is all valuable to autonomous 
medical decision-making.  The traditions and practices of state informed consent law, 
however, do not establish that the absence of such information invalidates an individual’s 
consent to the invasion accompanied by treatment.  In fact, quite the opposite is true.85  
Accordingly, it is very difficult to justify constitutional protection for a right to know all 
material treatment information based on a fundamental right to refuse a medical invasion 
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of the body, and it is equally difficult to argue that the lack of such information places an 
undue burden on the right to refuse such a bodily invasion.  Third, even a constitutional 
right to know the invasive nature of a proposed treatment does not translate into a right to 
have a health care provider volunteer that information.  Instead, it is more likely a right to 
receive truthful and non-misleading answers to questions about the invasive nature of the 
treatment.  Certainly, it might be easier and more befitting of a patient’s lack of medical 
expertise for a state’s laws to require that physicians provide such information without 
being asked.  Placing the burden on a patient to inquire about the invasiveness of a 
proposed treatment, however, is not likely to be deemed “undue” because it provides a 
reasonable means of access to the information and therefore does not place a substantial 
obstacle in the path of a patient seeking to exercise her right to the information or her 
right to refuse the bodily intrusion of a proposed treatment. 
C. Alternatives for Recognizing a Prisoner’s Right to Receive the 
Disclosure of Material Treatment Information 
 
Protecting the interests of prisoners in receiving the disclosure of material 
treatment information as part of the informed consent process for any medical care they 
receive while incarcerated is important.  Indeed, the importance of that interest may have 
been what motivated the Third Circuit’s effort in White to derive a right to such 
disclosure from the right to be free of unwanted bodily invasions under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Yet, as described above, White is doctrinally flawed and therefore 
constitutionally suspect.  Accordingly, the interest of prisoners in receiving sufficient 
information to make informed treatment decisions is in jeopardy unless one or more 
alternatives exist for prisoners to enforce a right to the disclosure of material treatment 
information.  This section identifies some possible alternatives.  While it is beyond the 
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scope of this Article to analyze each alternative in detail, this section describes a 
sufficient number of alternatives to establish that the right described in White is not 
necessary in the effort to protect a prisoner’s informed consent rights. 
One such an alternative might be a Section 1983 claim enforcing the state’s 
obligation to provide for the medical care of those it incarcerates or otherwise holds in 
custody.  This duty was articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble, 
which held that “deliberate indifference to the serious medical needs of prisoners 
constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ . . . proscribed by the Eighth 
Amendment.”86  The same duty has been found to arise out of the Fourteenth 
Amendment for individuals held in state custody but not incarcerated.87 
The logic underlying the constitutional obligation of states to provide for the 
medical needs of those they hold in custody is based on the reality that those held in 
custody are unable to provide for their own needs, including their own medical needs.  As 
one commentator put it: 
At the most simple level, an inmate cannot self-treat by calling in sick, changing a 
diet, or purchasing and using simple remedies such as aspirin, cold pills, laxatives, 
or bandages.  More significantly, the inmate cannot choose a doctor or form of 
treatment.  Because in mates cannot go to the emergency room of a local hospital, 
inmates will have medical needs that must be met on an emergency basis and 
around the clock.  Prohibitions on the individual possession of drugs or medical 
devices, in addition to other security restrictions regulating medical care, result in 
the need for constant medical care.88 
 
Case law has not adequately addressed whether a failure to disclose material 
treatment information is actionable as a violation of the Eighth Amendment duty for the 
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   See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (pretrial detainee). 
88
   MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 355-356 (section 3:1) (3d ed. 2002). 
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2010) 
 30 
State to provide for the medical needs of those it holds in custody.89  Yet, the condition of 
dependence that justifies the obligation of the state to provide treatment appears broad 
enough to encompass such a disclosure duty owed by the State to prisoners.  In addition 
to lacking the expertise to know the risks of and alternatives to a treatment, prisoners also 
lack the ability to obtain such information easily on their own through research or by 
asking for information from other patients or other health care professionals.  Just as the 
state is the prisoner’s only source for medical care, it is also the prisoner’s source for 
information about proposed medical care. 
Re-articulating the right to receive the disclosure of material treatment 
information as founded on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment obligation of the state 
to provide medical care to those the state holds in custody avoids the primary weakness 
of the right as conceived under White.  It need not be derived from a right to be free of 
unwanted bodily invasions.  Instead, it allows for a court to reason from a pre-existing 
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   While no cases directly address this question, a few touch upon it indirectly, sending mixed signals as to 
the viability of an Eighth Amendment claim.  For example, in Riddick v. Modeny, 250 Fed.Appx. 482, 2007 
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find that the physician was deliberately indifferent, the Court specifically relied on the physician’s failure 
to disclose to the prisoner the potential cause of his hip pain.  Additionally, two other cases dismissed 
Eighth Amendment claims by prisoners, which were based on a failure to disclose material treatment 
information, but the dismissals were based on a failure to establish any injury rather than a non-cognizable 
duty to disclose such information under the Eighth Amendment.  See Abdush-Shahid, 933 F.Supp. 168 
(1996); Ieng v. Fleck, 2000 WL 1593397 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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duty to provide medical care.  Another advantage of basing the right on the state’s 
obligation to provide for the medical needs of those it holds in custody is that the right is 
more clearly limited to cases involving prisoners and others held in state custody. 
While a prisoner’s right to the disclosure of material treatment information seems 
to find support in the Eighth Amendment duty of the state to attend to the medical needs 
of those it holds in custody, the claim remains untested.90  Nonetheless, options remain 
for prisoners to enforce such a disclosure right.  For example, prisoners may have a cause 
of action based on state law claims for medical malpractice and negligence.91   
Additionally, a prisoner may claim a violation of a state statute, regulation, or policy that 
requires prisons to provide adequate medical care to prisoners.92  Prisoners may also 
bring claims under the Federal Torts Claims Act.93, 94 
Given these possible alternatives to substantive due process right to the disclosure 
material treatment information, the right announced in White is unnecessary.  As 
                                                 
90
  See id. 
91
  See, e.g., Moore v. State, No. W2008-02699-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 4932203 (Tenn. Ct. App., Dec. 23, 
2009)(prisoner brought medical malpractice and negligence actions against a physicians assistant employed 
by the State who refused to recommend surgery for the degenerative arthritis in the prisoner’s his hip); 
Pontbriand v. Bascomb, No. 2009-042, 2009 WL 2477608 (Vt. July, 2009) (prisoner brought medical 
malpractice claim against health care contractor retained by Department of Corrections relating to response 
to prisoner's heart attack); Johnson v. Richland Correctional Inst., No. 2002-09081, 2003 WL 21739049 
(Ohio Ct Cl., July 10, 2003) (prisoner brought suit against correctional facility for personal injuries arising 
from medical malpractice). 
92
 See, e.g., Rasumussen v. Skagit County, 448 F.Supp.2d 1203 (W.D. Wash., 2006); Watson v. California, 
21 Cal.App.4th 836 (1993)(prisoner brought an action against the state and a county based on their alleged 
failure to summon and provide medical care after he injured himself at a county jail and was transferred to 
state prison as required by Cal. Gov. Code §845.6.); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 30-A, § 1561 (any person 
incarcerated in a county jail has a right to adequate professional medical care…). 
93
 See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, No. 08-11212, 2009 WL 4039658 (5th Cir. 2009) (federal prisoner 
filed claim under Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) alleging that Federal Bureau of Prisons negligently 
failed to obtain written consent for his leg amputation.); Camp vs. United States, No. CV207-149, 2009 
WL1154112 (S.D.Ga 2009) (prisoner sufficiently stated a medical malpractice claim against the 
government under the Federal Tort Claims Act). 
94
 Despite these different causes of action, prisoners often do not bring these claims for a number of reasons 
including, sovereign immunity, civil disability statutes, and budgetary limitations.  See MICHAEL B. 
MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 360 (3rd ed. 2002).  Moreover, prisoners must exhaust remedies available 
through a prison’s internal grievance system before they can sustain a court claim.  See Prison Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134. 
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explained in the next section, an added benefit relying on those alternatives and 
overturning the substantive due process right announced in White is that it avoids the 
threat that White and its progeny pose to state informed consent law. 
 
III.  Implications of a Constitutional Right to Treatment Information for State Law 
The substantive due process right recognized in White to receive the disclosure of 
treatment information overlaps significantly with the typical right to receive treatment 
information enforced through states’ informed consent liability standards.  Consequently, 
the right will substantial affect state informed consent law, at least whenever state action 
is present.  This is because the right sets a constitutional floor for disclosure that is in 
close proximity to prevailing state liability standards, and it does so on the basis of a right 
to refuse treatment, which is shared by all individuals.  Thus, unless the right’s 
applicability is limited to circumstances in which the patient is held in government 
custody, it threatens to alter state liability standards, inject the politics of substantive due 
process into the interpretation of state informed consent law, and undermine the 
prerogative of each state to regulate the medical profession as it sees fit. 
 This section begins with a brief explanation of why the state action doctrine will 
not prevent the application of the constitutional right recognized in White and later cases 
in informed consent claims outside of the prison context where disclosure standards 
under state law normally control. 
A. State Action as an Incomplete Barrier to the Application of White in 
State Informed Consent Cases 
 
To appreciate how the constitutional right recognized in White and its progeny 
might threaten state informed consent law, it is necessary to understand that the state 
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2010) 
 33 
action doctrine cannot provide a reliable barrier between that constitutional right and 
states’ informed consent disclosure standards.  First state actors are defendants in many 
informed consent cases.  While most often medical care and informed consent takes place 
in the context of a private treatment relationship, care is often provided by a physician 
acting on behalf of the government.  Examples include care provided by a health care 
professional employed by the Veterans Administration, the Public Health Service, an 
Indian Health Service Hospital, or a state or local public hospital.95  A non-scientific 
review of all informed consent opinions published in 2008 and 2009 suggests that about 
twelve percent of cases decided in those years involve a state actor as a defendant.96 
Second, state action might be satisfied even in the case of private providers where 
care takes place in a jurisdiction with a significant statutory or regulatory structure for 
concerning informed consent.  Texas and Louisiana provide extreme examples; no state 
governments are more entangled in the informed consent process between doctors and 
patients. 
A Texas statute creates a state-sponsored “medical disclosure panel” whose job it 
is to review all medical procedures and sort them onto one of two official lists: those for 
which risks must be disclosed (known as “List A” procedures) and those for which no 
risk disclosure is required (known as “List B” procedures).97  For List A procedures, the 
                                                 
95
   See e.g., Frantz v. U.S., 29 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 1994) (claim for treatment at VA hospital); Borosavage v. 
U.S., 667 F.Supp.2d 208 (D. Mass. 2009)(claims against VA hospital physician); Santistevan v. U.S., 610 
F.Supp.2d 1036 (D.S.D. 2009) (claim against physician employed by a federal Indian Health Services 
Hospital); Leab v. Chambersburg Hosp., 230 F.R.D 395 (M.D.Pa. 2005)(claim against employee of the 
federal Public Health Service); Valazquez ex rel. Segarra v. City of New York Health and Hospitals Corp. 
(Jacobi Medical Center), 894 N.Y.S.2d 15 (2010) (action brought against public hospital in New York 
City). 
96
  I entered the search HE (“informed consent” /p (physician doctor medic!)) and DA (2009 2008) into the 
WESTLAW “allcases” database.  One hundred nineteen opinions were returned, and, of those, fifteen 
involved a state actor as a defendant. 
97
   See V.T.C.A Civ Prac & Rem Code section 74.103. 
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Panel also identifies and publishes the risks that must be disclosed.98  A physician 
proposing that a patient consent a List A procedure is obligated to disclose the risks 
identified by the Panel and only those risks, and the physician can disclose those risks by 
merely handing to the patient the risk disclosures created by the Panel.99  By providing 
those disclosures and obtaining the patient’s consent in writing, a physician triggers a 
presumption that she has fulfilled her disclosure duty,100 which can only be rebutted by a 
showing of fraud or incapacity of the patient.101  Likewise, a physician who does not 
disclose treatment risks of a List B procedure is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that 
she has fulfilled her disclosure duty.102 
A very similar system exists in Louisiana except that the Secretary of the 
Louisiana Department of Health and Hospitals, rather than a specially created disclosure 
panel.103  As in Texas, the lists of disclosures are published in the state administrative 
code.104  Unlike the Texas statute, Louisiana’s informed consent statute does not require 
that physicians disclose at least those risks identified by this administrative process.  
Rather, it permits physicians to identify and provide the appropriate disclosures on their 
                                                 
98
   See id. 
99
   See Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 891-892 (Tx. 1999) (physician who discloses all of the risks 
identified by the Medical Disclosure Panel for a List A procedure cannot be found negligent for failing to 
disclose other risks of the procedure). 
100
   See supra note 97, at section 74.106 (a)(1). 
101
   See Earle v. Ratliff, 998 S.W.2d 882, 891-892. 
102
   See supra note 97.  Because the issue has not been addressed by a Texas court, it is unclear how such a 
presumption could be rebutted.  Given that the risks listed for a List A procedure are the only risks that a 
physician is obligated to disclose, which leaves a plaintiff with only the strategy of attaching the validity of 
the consent, see Earle v. Ratliff, supra note 99, it seems likely that a court would not permit a plaintiff to 
rebut the presumption that the physician was not obligated to disclose any treatment risks for a List B 
procedure with evidence of the treatment risks associated with that procedure, again leaving the plaintiff 
with only the strategy of rebutting the consent.  In short, the presumption appears to be conclusive with 
respect to fulfillment of the duty to disclose.  
103
   See Louisiana Rev. Stat. sec. 40:1299.40.  Although the Louisiana Secretary of Health and Hospitals 
has responsibility for the system today, Louisiana originally relied on a medical disclosure panel when it 
first began to codify informed consent risk disclosure.  A 2008 state law reassigned the responsibilities of 
the panel to the Secretary of Health and Hospitals.  See the historical notes to Louisiana Rev. Stat. sec. 
40:1299.40. 
104
   See 48 Louisiana Admin. Code Pt. 1, sections 2301-2463. 
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own or to use the disclosures identified and published by the Secretary.105  Yet, the 
statute provides a powerful incentive to rely on the state-created disclosure lists.  A 
physician who provides to a patient the disclosures identified by the Louisiana Secretary 
of Health and Hospitals for the treatment at issue is entitled to a rebuttable presumption 
that she has satisfied her legal duty to provide material treatment information to the 
patient prior to seeking consent to treatment.106 
Based on these regulatory structures, a compelling argument can be made that 
state action exists in most informed consent cases in Texas and Louisiana.  According to 
U.S. Supreme Court precedent, state action exists where “there is such a ‘close nexus 
between the State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior ‘may be 
fairly treated as that of the State itself.’”107  This includes circumstances where private 
actors pursue state sanctioned private remedies using “state procedures with the overt, 
significant assistance of state officials . . . .”108  So, for example, the Supreme Court has 
held that state action exists where a state court named a private executor over a private 
estate according to state probate procedures.109  Likewise, the Court has found state 
action where a state court clerk, pursuant to a state statute, issued a writ of attachment in 
a private debt collection action, which writ was executed by a sheriff.110 
Using these standards, a plaintiff in an informed consent claim could argue 
credibly that state action exists when her private physician relied on the work of the 
disclosure panel (in Texas) or the Secretary of Health and Hospitals (in Louisiana) to 
                                                 
105
   See Louisiana Rev. Stat. sec. 40:1299.40E(2)(b). 
106
   See id. 40:1299.40E(7)(a)(i). 
107
   Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). 
108
   Tulsa Professional Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1340, 1345 (1988). 
109
   See Id.   
110
   See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 2744 (1982). 
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satisfy her disclosure obligations to the plaintiff.  Imagine, for example, private 
physicians, relying on the presumptions of non-liability promised under both states’ laws, 
disclose the risks of proposed treatments to patients by handing over the lists of risks 
created by an administrative agency.  In each case, the physician uses a state-created 
procedure to gain a presumption of non-liability, and they do so with the assistance of the 
work product of a state agency.  Moreover, the assistance to those physicians by Texas or 
Louisiana is significant because the state has determined for each physician what, if any, 
treatment information to disclose to their patients.  Outside of Texas or Louisiana, those 
determinations are made unaided by private physicians. 
While Texas and Louisiana are unique in their administrative determination of 
informed consent disclosures, other states employ a more common procedure of requiring 
public review panels to certify the authenticity of private malpractice claims before those 
claims may be filed in court.111  Still other states make a review by such a public panel 
available at the discretion of a state court judge or upon the request of either party to a 
malpractice claim, and those states make the panel’s findings admissible in court as 
presumptive evidence of negligence or non-negligence.112  Again, these procedures give 
rise to a credible claim of state action.  In each instance a private party is making use of 
state procedures for the resolution of a private dispute with the overt and significant 
assistance of a state-created panel. 
Because informed consent cases regularly arise that involve a state actor and are 
outside of the prison context, and because agencies in many states are directly involved in 
                                                 
111
   See e.g., Indiana (Ind. Code sec 34-18-8-4(1)), Louisiana (LSA-R.S. sec 40:1299.47B(1)(a)(i)), 
Nebraska (Neb. Rev. St. sec 44-2840). 
112
   See e.g., Florida (F.S.A sec 766.107); Kansas (K.S.A. sec 65-4901), New Hampshire (N.H. Rev. Stat. 
sec. 519-B:8), Delaware (18 Del.C. sec 6812). 
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the regulation or resolution of informed consent claims, we should expect that the 
substantive due process right to the disclosure of material treatment information as 
articulated in White will come into play.113  It will be available in some cases to trump 
state disclosure standards, which, as described more fully below, could alter state law 
significantly.  That would result in two different disclosure standards operating in a 
jurisdiction at once:  one for cases involving state action and one for all other cases.  
Given the complexities of the state action doctrine, this would undoubtedly add 
significant confusion to a state’s informed consent law and muddy any behavioral signal 
the law might otherwise send to health care professionals. 
B. How White and Its Progeny Might Invade State Informed Consent Law 
While informed consent law varies from state to state, there are several common 
attributes.114  The doctrine imposes two duties on physicians:  a duty to refrain from 
providing medical care to a patient without the patient’s consent, and a duty to disclose 
material information about a proposed treatment to a patient prior to seeking the patient’s 
consent.  An injurious breach of either duty gives rise to a cause of action, but the nature 
of the claim (and the remedy) depends on which duty is breached.  Harm caused by a 
breach of the duty to refrain from treating a patient without her consent is remedied 
through a battery action, which recognizes the treatment itself as a compensable harm.  
The duty does not apply in the case of an emergency where consent to stabilizing 
treatment is presumed.  Battery claims for medical treatment are rare; when filed, they 
                                                 
113
   An interesting question is whether a constitutional standard for disclosure would influence state law 
even in the absence of state action.  For example, a court might rely on the constitutional standard as 
persuasive authority for how to interpret state informed consent law in a dispute among private actors. 
114
   For in-depth analysis of the history, ethics and law of informed consent, see FADEN AND BEAUCHAMP, 
JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE (2d ed. 2001); Jay 
KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984). 
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typically allege that a physician exceeded the scope of the consent provided by the 
patient. 
Far more common are claims for the breach of the duty to disclose material 
information.  Such a claim arises when a patient has consented to a treatment but alleges 
that her consent was insufficiently informed because of the physician’s failure to disclose 
relevant information.  Except in Pennsylvania, such claims are brought under a 
professional negligence theory.115  While all states require the disclosure of material 
information, they employ different standards of materiality.  Nearly half of all states use 
the reasonable person standard, which defines material information as that which a 
reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient’s 
position, would consider relevant to the treatment decision at issue.116  The other states 
use the prudent physician standard, which defines material information as that which a 
reasonably prudent physician, in the same or similar clinical circumstances, would 
disclose.117  There are several exceptions to the duty to disclose.118  A physician is 
obligated to disclose neither treatment risks that are too remote when considered in light 
of the severity of harm nor risks that are already known to the particular patient or to 
laypersons generally.  Nor must a physician disclose treatment information to a patient 
suffering from an emergency, or where the patient waives her right to such disclosures, or 
                                                 
115
   See e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir 1972).  Fraud in obtaining a patient’s consent to 
treatment is an exception.  Where proven, the fraud negates the patient’s consent and gives rise to a battery 
claim.  See FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW:  CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 282-283 (6th ed. 2008).  
Pennsylvania law is unique.  Rather than remedy negligent disclosure through a professional negligence 
claim and fraud in obtaining consent through a battery claim, it relies on a battery action for all claims 
related to informed consent, including negligent failure to disclose material information.  See [PA case].   
116
   See e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir 1972). 
117
   See FURROW ET AL, supra note 115 at 240 (reporting that a “slight majority” of jurisdictions have 
adopted the prudent physician standard and citing to examples). 
118
   See MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 
220 (7th ed. 2007). 
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where the physician determines, based on “sound medical judgment[,] that 
communication of . . . risk information would present a threat to the patient’s well-
being.”119 
Regardless of the standard for disclosure, all states require the plaintiff to 
establish “decision-causation,” meaning that the failure to disclose information caused 
the treatment decision.120  A few states permit a subjective standard for decision-
causation, asking whether the plaintiff herself would have refused the treatment had the 
undisclosed information been revealed.121  The vast majority of jurisdictions, however, 
reject the subjective standard out of concern that it would saddle fact-finders with 
prejudicial testimony from sympathetic plaintiffs with the benefit if hindsight.  Instead, 
they employ an objective standard for decision-causation:  whether a reasonable person, 
in the patient’s position and armed with the undisclosed information, would have refused 
the treatment.122  In addition to requiring proof of decision-causation, all states require 
that plaintiffs establish that the treatment resulted in a bad outcome attributable to the 
undisclosed information.123  So, for example, a plaintiff claiming that her physician failed 
to disclose a material risk of infection associated with a procedure to which she consented 
must prove not only that a reasonable person in her position would not have consented to 
the procedure had the risk of infection been disclosed, but also that the risk actually 
materialized in her case causing her harm.  Unlike battery claims for failure to refrain 
from treatment absent consent, negligence claims for failure to disclose material 
                                                 
119
   Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789. 
120
   See e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir 1972). 
121
   See e.g., Error! Main Document Only.40 Pa.Stat. § 1303.504(d); Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 
554 (1980). 
122
   See id. 
123
   See e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir 1972). 
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2010) 
 40 
information do not recognize the treatment itself as a compensable harm.  Instead, 
damages are limited to harm caused by the undisclosed risk that materialized in the 
patient’s treatment.124 
While informed consent law is generally well settled in each state, controversies 
remain about how to interpret and apply the law.  Additionally, there are important 
differences among the states both as to the standards employed and how those standards 
are applied in a particular case.  A constitutional “right to such information as is 
reasonably necessary to make an informed decision to accept or reject proposed 
treatment,”125 including “a reasonable explanation of the viable alternative treatments . . 
.”
126
 has substantial implications for these controversies and differences. 
Consider, for example, a garden-variety claim that a physician failed to disclose a 
treatment risk prior to the patient’s consenting to and receiving the treatment.  The 
process of determining whether the defendant-physician breached a duty to disclose 
material information by failing to disclose this risk information calls for several legal and 
factual judgments, which, if made in such a way as to deny recovery to the plaintiff-
patient, could be challenged as violating the patient’s substantive due process right to 
information “reasonably necessary” to an informed treatment decision, at least in cases 
where state action exists.  The first of these judgments is – in jurisdictions applying the 
prudent physician standard of materiality – to determine the “clinical circumstances” in 
which to place the reasonably prudent physician so as to assess what that objectified 
                                                 
124
   See BERG ET AL supra note 114 at 134, 141.  The underlying logic is that a negligent failure to disclose 
material treatment information does not negate the consent provided by the patient, but it works an estoppel 
against a physician’s claiming that the patient, through her consent to treatment, assumed responsibility for 
the undisclosed risk and the harm that resulted when that risk materialized in her case. 
125
   White, 897 F.2d 103, 113. 
126
   Id. 
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physician would disclose, or – in a jurisdiction applying the reasonable person standard 
of materiality – it is the determination of the “patient’s position” into which is placed the 
reasonable person so as to assess what that objectified person would consider significant 
to the treatment decision at hand.127  Whether and to what extent “clinical circumstance” 
or “patient’s position” includes idiosyncratic attributes of the patient (her goals for 
treatment, her level of risk aversion, her religious beliefs, etc) beyond her diagnosis and 
the treatment her physician has recommended significantly affects whether the 
undisclosed risk will be deemed “material” under state law and thus subject to 
disclosure.128  The fewer idiosyncracies accounted for in a state court decision, the more 
likely that the decision can be challenged as an unconstitutional deprivation of the right to 
information reasonably necessary to enable the patient to make an informed treatment 
decision.  Then there is the determination of materiality itself.  A state court verdict based 
on a determination that certain risk information was not material could be challenged as 
violative of the constitutional right to information reasonably necessary for an informed 
decision.  State court decisions finding that risk information need not be disclosed 
because the risk is “remote” or “common knowledge” among laypersons would be 
subject to similar challenge.129 
                                                 
127
   See Robert Gatter, Informed Consent and the Forgotten Duty of Physician Inquiry, 31 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 557 (2000) (arguing that the starting place in the application of either objective standard of materiality 
is to determine which subjective attributes of the patient must be accounted for in the objective test and 
which subjective attributes may be disregarded). 
128
   See id. 
129
   The challenge would likely occur as part of an appeal of any case in which the plaintiff lost at trial.  
Whether targeting the state trial court’s determination as a matter of law that a particular undisclosed risk 
was immaterial under the state’s prevailing disclosure standard or too remote, or the state court’s jury 
instructions concerning the standard for disclosure or remoteness, or the state court’s reliance on a jury 
verdict to dispose of the case, the losing plaintiff would challenge the trial court’s actions as a deprivation 
of a substantive liberty interest without due process of law pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.  See 
e.g., [cite].  Additionally, a losing plaintiff might challenge a state court decision on procedural due process 
grounds, arguing that state law must is procedurally defective to the extent that it does not assess whether 
risk information found to be immaterial under state law is nonetheless “reasonably necessary” to an 
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Additional constitutional challenges could result concerning matters over which 
states are split if White is correct that a substantive due process right exists for individuals 
to receive information reasonably necessary to make informed treatment decisions.  For 
example, states are split as to whether information concerning the treating physician (e.g., 
her level of experience with a particular procedure, her history of alcohol or drug abuse, 
or her financial conflicts of interest) constitutes material information that must be 
disclosed.130  Where state action exists, a ruling that such information is not material 
potentially violates a right to information reasonably necessary to informed treatment 
decisions.  More fundamentally, states are split over whether to measure the sufficiency 
of disclosures from the perspective of a prudent physician (treating disclosures as a 
matter of medical expertise) or whether to do so from the perspective of a reasonable 
person (treating disclosures as a matter of personal values).131  The use of the prudent 
physician standard could be challenged as violating a constitutional right to information 
reasonably necessary to informed decision-making to the extent that it results in 
permitting fewer disclosures than would a standard that requires the fact-finder to assess 
the necessity of information from the perspective of laypersons who must ultimately 
make the treatment decisions.132 
                                                                                                                                                 
informed treatment decision pursuant to White.  See e.g., Zinernon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990) 
(challenging the application in his case of a state policy and procedure for involuntary commitment by staff 
members at a state mental hospital, and resulting in a determination that those procedures were inadequate 
to satisfy procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
130
   See e.g., Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495 (Wis. 1996) (recognizing a duty to disclose lack of 
experience with a particular procedure); Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255 (Pa. 2001) (state law does not 
require a physician to disclose personal characteristics or experience); Hidding v. Williams, 578 So.2d 
1192 (La.App.1991) (physician’s failure to disclose chronic alcoholism violates state informed consent 
law); Albany Urology Clinic, P.C. v. Cleveland, 528 S.E.2d 777 (Ga. 2000) (no obligation to disclose drug 
use under state informed consent law). 
131
   See supra notes 116 and 117 and the accompanying text. 
132
   Although the Court in Canterbury was not addressing a constitutional claim, it outlined the logic that 
might lead a court to conclude that constitutional right to information that is reasonably necessary to 
informed decision-making requires a disclosure standard that considers the value of information from the 
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The foregoing describes how readily common state law questions about the 
proper scope of disclosure requirements can become constitutional questions, at least 
when there is state action.  The more this occurs, the larger questions of federalism will 
loom. 
 The more influential a federal constitutional standard becomes, the more we risk 
losing the heterogeneity of approaches to disclosure laws we enjoy today.133  To be clear, 
the diversity of approaches reflects more than just different ways to enforce the same 
norms; it reflects normative differences as well. 
 Informed consent law is perceived to be at the heart of the doctor-patient 
relationship.134  Accordingly, it reveals a normative viewpoint of that relationship, and its 
ongoing application to cases offers the opportunity to publicly reaffirm or amend that 
viewpoint.  Thus, some states may take the view that the doctor-patient relationship is a 
fiduciary one and that this justifies a standard of disclosure obligating physicians to 
reveal not only material information about a treatment but also material information 
about themselves to their patients.135  Meanwhile, another State might conceive of the 
doctor-patient relationship as something akin to an arms-length relationship in a 
specialized market, and that disclosure rules provide an incentive for physicians to at 
                                                                                                                                                 
perspective of the layperson who has the right to make that decision.  “[T]he patient’s right of self-decision 
shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal. That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient 
possesses enough information to enable an intelligent choice.  The scope f the physician’s communications 
to the patient, then , must be measured by the patient’s need, and that need is the information material to the 
decision.”  464 F.2d at 786. 
133
   See generally Elaine W. Shoben, Uncommon Law and the Bill of Rights: The Woes of 
Constitutionalizing State Common-Law Torts, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 173 (1992). 
134
   See Robert Gatter, The Mysterious Survival of the Policy Against Informed Consent Liability for 
Hospitals, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1203, 1264-66 (2006) (arguing that the reason courts resist imposing 
informed consent liability on hospitals is because of an unarticulated sense that to do so would disrupt a 
delicate and intimate moment that sustains trust in the doctor-patient relationship). 
135
   See Mark A. Hall, Law, Medicine and Trust, 55 STANFORD L. REV. 463, 487-90 (2002) (arguing that 
informed consent law is a quintessential example of a syllogistic stance with respect to health law and trust: 
because the doctor-patient relationship is or should be a relationship of trust, then physicians have a 
fiduciary obligation to disclose information and seek consent prior to treatment). 
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2010) 
 44 
least warn patients of potential hazards in proposed treatments and options for avoiding 
those hazards.  As a result, the disclosure rules in that state might not be interpreted to 
require the disclosure of information about the physician.  A substantive due process right 
to the disclosure of material treatment information could significantly diminish the 
opportunity to articulate and reassess the normative viewpoints that underlie informed 
consent law.  Yet, the normative differences revealed in state law today would not 
disappear as a result.  Rather, they would exist but informed consent law would be less 
likely to reflect those differences, which could have a destabilizing effect on informed 
consent law. 
 This is consistent with current conceptions of health law generally.  A persistent 
theme among those who seek cohesive principles for health law is that such principles 
may be out of reach unless normative clashes are better articulated and resolved at least 
within particular topical spheres where health law operates.136  If accurate, this 
description of the state of health law as a coherent field counsels in favor of allowing 
states to conduct the interpretive work on disclosure rules as much as possible. 
 The issue goes beyond concerns about federalizing disclosure law and includes 
concerns implicated by “constitutionalizing” disclosure law through substantive due 
process.  Recognizing an individual’s interest in receiving all information reasonably 
necessary to informed medical decision-making as a fundamental liberty interest would 
not only push debate about the normative underpinnings of disclosure laws out of public 
arenas other than federal courts, it would also redefine those debates in terms of liberty 
and self-determination.  Other normative issues that combine with the value of respect for 
                                                 
136
   See e.g., M. Gregg Bloche, The Invention of Health Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 247 (2003); William M. 
Sage, Relational Duties, Regulatory Duties, and the Widening Gap Between Individual Health Law and 
Collective Health Policy, 96 GEO. L.J. 497 (2008). 
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individual liberty to develop a disclosure rule for liability purposes would be largely 
stripped away.  These include the assignment of responsibility for risks of treatment 
between doctor and patient, fair compensation to those injured as a result of professional 
negligence, protection of physicians from liability based on a bad outcome rather than 
professional negligence, and, as described above, promotion of a shared normative view 
of the doctor-patient relationship.137  Rule-making that fails to account adequately for all 
of these issues may result in rules that are impractical or that lack public support because 
they express a norm of self-determination at the expense of other concerns with which 
rules of liability must contend. 
 Additionally, the more state informed consent law is subject to the information 
disclosure rule under White, the more it is subject to the unique politics of substantive due 
process jurisprudence.  Whether the guarantee of due process in the federal Constitution 
gives rise to any substantive rights and, if so, what rights is deeply controversial and 
closely linked to the politics of judicial activism, separation of powers, and federalism.138  
Moreover, substantive due process is tied inexorably to the hot-button topics of privacy, 
abortion, physician-assisted suicide, refusing life-sustaining medical care, and 
                                                 
137
   See Alexander Morgan Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 
123 U. Penn L. Rev. 340, 365-376 (1974) (describing the several functions of informed consent law to 
include protecting patient autonomy, encouraging reflection by physicians and rationality by patients in 
medical decision-making, and involving the public generally in medicine). 
138
   See Patrick M. Garry, A Different Model for the Right to Privacy: The Political Question Doctrine as a 
Substitute for Substantive Due Process, 61 U. MIAMI L. REV. 169 (2006); James W. Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron 
Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 16 CONST. COM. 315, 315 
(1999) (substantive due process is politically contentious doctrine); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF 
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 31 (1990) (describing substantive due process as a 
“sham”); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Reining In Abuses of Executive Power Through Substantive Due 
Process, 60 FLA. L. REV. 519, 521 (describing substantive due process as “one of the most . . . controversial 
areas of constitutional” because of its protection of “contentious non-textual rights” and the issues it raises 
“regarding the proper role of the judiciary in reviewing the actions of other branches of government . . . .”); 
Randy E. Barnett, Scrutiny Land, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1479 (2008)(addressing the problems of judicial 
activism associated with various standards for identifying substantive rights protected under the due 
process clause). 
45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2010) 
 46 
homosexuality.139  This, in turn, has implications for how disputes are resolved through 
substantive due process.  Thus, when the U.S. Supreme Court holds that the Constitution 
does not protect a liberty interest in physician-assisted suicide, it must carefully 
distinguish an interest in assisted suicide from an interest in avoiding a medical battery.140  
Similarly, the Court must distinguish between concepts of autonomy on the one hand, 
which were referenced in opinions protecting against unduly burdensome abortion 
restrictions and yet given no weight in an opinion on physician-assisted suicide, and 
concepts of tradition and liberty that justify a right to refuse unwanted life-sustaining 
treatments.141  Moreover, this explains why activists for reproductive rights find it 
necessary to support a constitutional challenge to state prohibitions on physician assisted 
suicide.142  Accordingly, one risk of the substantive due process right articulated in White 
is that the shadow issues of judicial activism, privacy and abortion will predominate its 
application to state informed consent law, confusing other important political 
considerations or even crowding them out completely. 
Thus, there is cause for concern that a substantive due process right to material 
treatment information as articulated in White will invade, distort, and destabilize 
disclosure rules in state informed consent law.  This, in turn, leads to the conclusion that 
a narrow interpretation of the right to refuse treatment and any derivative right to 
information is the better interpretation and not just the more doctrinally sound 
interpretation.  It also provides an additional reason to protect the interest of prisoners to 
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   See Yale Kamisar, Can Glucksberg Survive Lawrence? Another Look at the End of Life and Personal 
Autonomy, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1453, 1456-7 (2008)(recognizing the link between substantive due process, 
privacy and sexuality); Levinson, supra note 138; Susan Frelich Appleton, Assisted Suicide and 
Reproductive Freedom: Exploring Some Connections, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 15 (1998) (recognizing the 
political and potential legal links between rights to physician assisted suicide and abortion). 
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   See supra notes 65 and 66 and the accompanying text. 
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   See supra notes 66 and 67 and the accompanying text. 
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   See Appelton, supra note 139, at 15. 
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receive material treatment information through some mechanism other than the right 
articulated in White.143 
C. White is Not Necessary to Correct the Most Inadequate State 
Disclosure Standards 
 
Of course, some states have grossly inadequate disclosure standards, including 
those in Georgia, Pennsylvania and Texas.  Remedying those inadequacies is the best 
argument for a broadly applicable constitutional right to the disclosure of material 
treatment information as articulated in White.  Yet, as discussed below, it is not a 
sufficient argument because there are other ways to address those inadequacies. 
In Georgia, a statute grants individuals the right to be provided with material 
treatment information, including risk information and alternatives, if and when they are 
considering a surgical procedure that would be provided under general, spinal or regional 
anesthesia or if they are considering whether to consent to amniocentesis or any 
diagnostic procedure involving the injection of intravenous or intraductal contrast 
material.144  The statute does not address whether the disclosures required for the listed 
procedures are also required for other non-listed procedures.145  The Court of Appeals of 
Georgia twice ruled that the statute does not preclude a common law duty for physicians 
to disclose material treatment information to patients that applies beyond the limited 
clinical circumstances described in the statute.146  In 2009, however, the Supreme Court 
of Georgia overruled those two opinions, holding that the statute imposes a duty to 
disclose material treatment information only in those limited circumstances and that it 
                                                 
143
   See supra notes 86 through 94 and the accompanying text. 
144
   See Ga. Code Ann. Section 31-9-6.1. 
145
   See id. at section 31-9-6.1(b)(2). 
146
   See Ketchup v. Howard, 543 S.E.2d 371 (Ga. App. 2000), overruling Young v. Yarn, 222 S.E.2d 113 
(Ga. App. 1975), overruled by Blotner v. Doreika, 678 S.E.2d 80 (Ga. 2009). 
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prohibits courts from recognizing a common law duty to disclosure beyond the limited 
duty recognized in the statute.147  What results is an absurdly unfair disclosure regime in 
which patients have a right to the disclosure of the risks of surgery, but not the risks of 
prescription medications or of a chiropractic manipulation.  Certainly, a substantive due 
process right to the disclosure of material treatment information, which applies to all 
treatments, could be used to invalidate the Georgia statute and to enforce disclosure 
across all treatments.148 
Pennsylvania enforces a duty to disclose material information, but – as in Georgia 
– it does so only in the case of certain procedures listed in a state statute.149  These 
include surgery, the use of anesthesia for surgery, radiation, chemotherapy, blood 
transfusions, inserting a surgical devise or appliance, the administration of an 
experimental drug or an approved drug in an experimental manner, and the 
administration of an experimental device or an approved device in an experimental 
manner.150  As a result, Pennsylvania courts have dismissed claims brought by patients 
alleging that their physicians failed to disclose material treatment information where the 
treatments at issue do not appear on the statutory list.151  Thus, Pennsylvania law is as 
                                                 
147
   See Blotner v. Doreika, 678 S.E.2d 80 (Ga. 2009).  
148
   The Court of Appeals of Georgia made exactly this argument – without citing to White – in its rulings 
in both Ketchup and Dorieka even though neither case appeared to involve state action.  The Supreme 
Court of Georgia, however, did not address the constitutional argument when it overruled those cases. 
149
   Prior to the statute, Pennsylvania common law restricted the duty to disclose material information to 
cases in which the patient underwent surgery.  See Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617 (Pa. 1997) (Neither 
an injection of nerve block medication nor an injection of steroid is a surgical procedure and therefore 
neither triggers the common law duty to of a physician to disclose risk information). 
150
   See Pa. Stat. Ann. Section 1303.504. 
151
   See Reed v. Advanced Radiology Services, 2006 WL 4475088 (May 2, 2006, Pa. Com. Pls.) (holding 
that a patient who received a mammogram from a physician cannot sustain an informed consent claim 
against the physician for failure to disclose risk information because receiving a mammography does not 
trigger disclosure obligations under state informed consent law); Kremp v. Yavorek, 2002 WL 31730629 
(May 24 2002, Pa. Com. Pls.) (affirming the dismissal of a patient’s claim that her physician had failed to 
provide sufficient treatment information prior to delivering the patient’s child by VBAC because VBAC is 
not a procedure that triggers the physician’s duty to disclose). 
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absurd as the law in Georgia, enforcing a right to receive treatment information for only 
some kinds of medical care. 
Texas informed consent law, described earlier, also imposes a duty of disclosure 
on physicians with respect to some procedures, but not others.  Every procedure is 
categorized by an administrative panel as either a procedure for which risk disclosures 
are required (known as a “List A” procedure) or a procedure for which no risk disclosure 
is required (known as a “List B” procedure).152  Even a cursory review of List B 
procedures reveals several highly invasive procedures that almost certainly have 
significant risks associated with them:  appendectomy, colonoscopy, and breast and lung 
biopsies are just a few examples.153  Yet, Texas law does not impose a duty to disclose 
any risk information to patients considering those procedures. 
 It is tempting to embrace White’s constitutional right to the disclosure of all 
information reasonably necessary to make informed treatment decisions when confronted 
with the woefully inadequate standards in Georgia, Pennsylvania and Texas.  Such a right 
could invalidate laws that fall below a national standard articulated in White, at least 
whenever state action is present.  Yet, as argued above, doing so comes at a price.  A 
substantive due process right is a powerful and blunt legal tool that is ill-suited to the task 
of balancing the various interests and norms at work in informed consent law.154  
Furthermore, it is not necessary to employ such a right, not even to remedy the 
inadequacies of the disclosure standards in Georgia, Pennsylvania, and Texas, because 
other options exist. 
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   See supra notes 97 through 102 and the accompanying text. 
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   See 25 Tex. Adm. Code sections601.3(c)(1) (appendectomy), 601.3(c)(9) (colonoscopy), 601.3(i)(1) 
(breast biopsy), 601.3(o)(3) (lung biopsy). 
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   See generally Elaine W. Shoben, Uncommon Law and the Bill of Rights: The Woes of 
Constitutionalizing Common-law Torts, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 173 (1992). 
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 States’ disclosure laws exist against a backdrop of other legal and non-legal 
sources for encouraging and enforcing the communication of adequate information from 
doctor to patient, which diminish the need for a substantive due process right to such 
information.  For example, informed consent is a doctrine of medical ethics as well as 
law,155 and the doctrine, including the ethical obligation of physicians to assure that 
patients are well informed, is a featured part of medical ethics curricula that all U.S. 
medical schools, as a condition of their accreditation, are required to incorporate into 
their educational programs.156  Additionally, many physician organizations have 
incorporated a commitment to fully informed medical decision-making into their policy 
statements.157  While such ethical standards are considered aspirational and do not 
establish standards of care enforceable through professional liability, they can form a 
basis for disciplinary action against physicians by state licensing agencies.  For example, 
Pennsylvania’s Board of Medical Examiners has the authority to discipline physicians for 
“immoral or unprofessional conduct,” which are defined to include “departure from or 
failing to conform to an ethical . . . standard of the profession.”158   Thus, a board of 
medical examiners could discipline a physician for failing to provide material treatment 
information to patients even where the failure to provide such information would not 
constitute professional negligence. 
 Hospital accreditation standards of the Joint Commission provide an even more 
compelling example of indirect, national regulation of informed consent disclosures.  The 
                                                 
155
   See generally FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 114; BERG ET AL, supra note 114; AMERICAN 
MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, AMA CODE OF ETHICS 8.08, available at http://www.ama-
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   See AAMC Accreditation Standards for Medical Schools. 
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Joint Commission is the leading private accreditation organization for health care 
institutions in the United States.  Hospitals with Joint Commission accreditation are 
deemed by regulation to satisfy Medicare’s “conditions of participation.”159  The 
overwhelming majority of U.S. hospitals participate in Medicare, and most of them 
qualify for Medicare participation through Joint Commission accreditation.  Thus, the 
Joint Commission’s accreditation standards have acquired the force of law through their 
endorsement by Medicare.160 
Joint Commission standards include standards related to informed consent and the 
disclosure of material treatment information in particular.  They require that a hospital 
have in place a policy and procedure to assure that physicians practicing in the hospital 
discuss with patients the risks and benefits of proposed treatments, reasonable alternative 
treatments, and the risks and benefits of those alternatives.161  Physicians, by accepting 
privileges to admit patients to a hospital accredited by the Joint Commission, agree to 
abide by the hospital’s policies and procedures, including those that incorporate this 
disclosure standard.  In this way a physician becomes contractually obligated to provide 
material information to any hospital patient considering any form of treatment even if the 
physician practices in a state where the disclosure of material treatment information is 
required for some but not all treatments.162 
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   See 42 C.F.R. sec. 488.5. 
160
   The publicly endorsed Joint Commission standards are an example of “shadow health law” in the sense 
that they regulate indirectly through a public-private relationship.  See Sandra H. Johnson, Regulating 
Physician Behavior: Taking Doctors’ “Bad Law” Claims Seriously, 53 ST. LOUIS L.J. 973, 992 (2009) (for 
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   See e.g., Linkous v. U.S., 142 F.3d 271, 276 (5th Cir. 1998)(recognizing that, while a hospital informed 
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 Even without the assurances provided by this backdrop of ethical and 
accreditation standards, the need for a substantive due process right to receive material 
treatment information is diminished by the availability of an equal protection claim, at 
least whenever there is state action.  Although the legal obligation to disclose material 
treatment information in some states applies to only certain procedures, every state 
imposes such a duty of disclosure on physicians for at least some forms of treatment.  
Consequently, an equal protection argument can be used to expand the applicability of a 
state’s own duty to disclose material treatment information.163 
 For example, consider how such a claim might be used to challenge Pennsylvania 
law.  There, the duty to disclose material treatment information has been interpreted to 
apply only to surgery, the use of anesthesia for surgery, radiation, chemotherapy, blood 
transfusions, inserting a surgical devise or appliance, the administration of an 
experimental drug or an approved drug in an experimental manner, and the 
administration of an experimental device or an approved device in an experimental 
manner.164  A review of the list does not reveal any reason why it contains the forms of 
treatment it does or why it does not also contain others.165  Certainly there are 
prescription medications that, even when used for their approved purpose, are as risky to 
a patient as chemotherapy or some other treatment on the list.  The same can be said for a 
variety of diagnostic procedures.  And yet patients considering those procedures are not 
afforded the same informational rights as patients considering listed procedures.  Thus, 
even though the division of medical treatments into the categories of “on” or “off” the 
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   See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 799 (1997) (explaining an equal protection claim). 
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   See Pa. Stat. Ann. Section 1303.504. 
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statutory list does not involve a suspect classification that would trigger strict scrutiny of 
the categorization, it is nonetheless susceptible to attack on equal protection grounds 
because the categorization appears to lack even a rational basis.166  Accordingly, the 
claim could be used to extend the informational protections associated with some 
treatments to other treatments with similar risk profiles. 
 The value of an equal protection claim is that it addresses a state’s uneven 
application of its requirement that physicians disclose material treatment information, and 
it does so without deciding whether such a disclosure standard is inherent in the 
Constitution.  The Equal Protection clause “creates no substantive rights.”167  Instead, it 
draws its substance from existing state law and inquires whether similarly situated cases 
are being treated similarly under that law.168  
 
Conclusion 
 White and its progeny recognize a substantive due process right to treatment 
information that mimics disclosure rules that determine liability under state informed 
consent law.  It is claimed to be a right derived from the right to refuse treatment that was 
acknowledged by Cruzan as a fundamental liberty interest that could be inferred from the 
Supreme Court’s substantive due process rulings, and it would require state actors to 
assure that individuals receive (whether or not they ask for it) all information reasonably 
necessary for informed medical decision-making. 
 As this Article has argued, the doctrinal grounds for the claimed right are weak, 
and public policy considerations counsel against it.  Moreover, the availability of other 
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avenues both for protecting the interest of prisoners in receiving material treatment 
information and for correcting inadequate disclosure standards in states like Georgia, 
Louisiana, Pennsylvania and Texas.  Consequently, White and its progeny should be 
overruled. 
 While the a constitutional right to material treatment information is a tempting fix 
for disclosure laws that are grossly inadequate in a few States, such a right is unnecessary 
and comes a too high a price.  Other legal and non-legal sources for assuring that patients 
are well informed as they make treatment decisions and the availability of an equal 
protection claim in states where disclosure rules are most lacking provide sufficient 
protection. 
